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 Generic sentences with indefinite and bare subjects in Brazilian Portuguese* 
Ana Müller 
University of São Paulo, Brazil 
This paper addresses the semantics of two types of generic 
sentences in Brazilian Portuguese (BPg): generic sentences 
with Indefinite Subjects (IS); and generic sentences with 
Bare Numberless (BN) subjects. The two types of sentences 
are both instances of generic quantification. Nonetheless, 
they differ in their semantics: IS sentences are more 
normative, whereas BN sentences are more descriptive. I 
show that Greenberg’s 2002 approach for IS and Bare 
Plural English generic sentences holds for IS and BN 
generic sentences in BPg, and that the differences between 
the two sentences should be attributed to the fact that they 
express different kinds of modalities.  The paper claims that 
the ability to induce different modalities is related to the 
different denotations of their subject nominals. IS subjects 
have atomic denotations and generalizations based on atoms 
are much more restricted than generalizations based on the 
number-neutral denotations of BN subjects.  
1. Introduction
This paper addresses the semantics of two types of generic sentences in Brazilian
Portuguese (BPg): (i) generic sentences with Indefinite Subjects (IS) as in (1); and (ii) 
generic sentences with Bare Numberless (BN) subjects as in (2). IS and BN generic 
sentences in BPg are similar in many ways to IS and Bare Plural (BP) generic sentences 
in English. Both types of sentences have been claimed in the literature to be instances of 
generic quantification and to have a logical form as in (3) (see Krifka et al. 1995, 
Chierchia 1995, 1998, Wilkinson 1991).1  
(1) Um número par    é   divisível por 2.
a    number  even is  divisible by  2
‘An even number is divisible by 2’
* I  thank Irene Heim for comments on a first draft of this paper.
1 For simplicity, my examples will mostly be with I-level predicates. I assume they have no event argument
(see Kratzer 1995).
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(2)  Número par   é  divisível por 2.  
number  even is divisible by  2 
‘Even numbers are divisible by 2’ 
 
(3) GEN [x] (even number [x]; divisible by 2 [x]) 
 
Nonetheless, IS and BP generic sentences are not completely synonymous: (i) IS 
sentences are perceived as more normative, whereas BP sentences are perceived as more 
descriptive; (ii) the two types of sentences are not felicitous in the same kinds of contexts 
– IS sentences fit ‘predictive’ contexts, whereas BP sentences fit ‘inductive’ contexts (see 
Lawler 1973, Burton-Roberts 1977, Declerk 1991, and more recently Greenberg 2002). 
Greenberg 2002 claims that IS generic sentences  express generalizations that are 
true ‘in virtue of’ some property of its subject, whereas BP generic sentences express 
descriptive generalizations. The author attributes the semantic differences between the 
two kinds of sentences to the different types of modalities they express. IS sentences are 
evaluated in worlds in which their subject has a certain culturally presupposed property. 
BP generic sentences, on the other hand, are evaluated in worlds that resemble ours in a 
vague way.  
This paper shows that Greenberg’s approach also holds for IS and BN generic 
sentences in BPg, and that the differences between the two types of sentences should be 
attributed to the fact that they express different kinds of modalities.  This paper claims 
that the ability to induce different modalities is related to the different denotations of 
indefinite and bare numberless subjects. IS subjects have atomic denotations, and 
generalizations based on atoms are much more restricted than generalizations based on 
the number-neutral denotations of BN subjects.  
In section 2, I introduce the semantics of IS and BN generic sentences in BPg. 
Section 3 provides a brief overview of the currently prevalent approaches to the 
semantics of generically quantified sentences. Section 4 describes the differences 
between IS and BN sentences. In section 5, I present Greenberg's 2002 account for 
English IS and BP generic sentences and discuss its application to BPg. In section 6, I 
argue that the differences between the two types of sentences should be attributed to the 
different denotations of their subject nominals. Finally, in section 7, I state the concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. IS and BN generic sentences are instances of generic quantification in 
Brazilian Portuguese 
 
Most current theories of genericity hold that there are two different modes of 
expressing it: (i) genericity may be expressed by the Determiner Phrase (DP); or (ii) it 
may be an effect of generic quantification. In the first case, the generic interpretation is 
achieved through the use of kind referring expressions – expressions that are by 
themselves capable of denoting kinds, as the DP a onça  (‘the jaguar’) in (4a). The logical 
representation in (4b) expresses the fact that the DP a onça is like a proper name - the 
proper name of a species - and it may be directly taken as the argument of a predicate, 
just like the proper name Jorge in (5a-b). 
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(4) a. A    onça    está ameaçada     de  extinção.  
       the  jaguar is     on-the-verge of extinction 
  ‘Jaguars are on the verge of extinction’ 
 
 b. on-the-verge-of- extinction (THE-JAGUAR) 
 
(5) a. Jorge é  inteligente. 
      Jorge is intelligent 
      ‘Jorge is intelligent’ 
 
 b. intelligent (JORGE) 
 
Both IS and BN sentences in BPg are instances of generic quantification (see 
Müller 2001, 2002), as is usually claimed for IS and BP generic sentences in Romance 
languages (see Longobardi 2001, Chierchia 1998). IS and BN generic subjects then are 
not kind-referring expressions in BPg. This is demonstrated by their inability to combine 
with kind predication, as in (6-7), and by the inexistence of a generic interpretation with 
one-event-only episodic predicates, as in (8). 
 
(6) *Uma onça   /*Onça   está ameaçada      de extinção.  
      a      jaguar/   jaguar is     on-the-verge of extinction 
‘Jaguars are on the verge of extinction’ 
 
(7) *Uma manga/*Manga vai   ficando maior quanto mais  nos     aproximamos       
  a     mango /  mango  goes turning bigger as        more SELF approach-1PPL  
 
do        Nordeste. 
of–the Northeast 
 
‘Mangoes keep getting bigger as we approach the Northeast’ 
 
(8) *Um homem/ *Homem chegou na       Lua    em  1960.2 
     a     man     /   man       arrived  in-the Moon in   1960 
‘Men set foot on the Moon in 1960’ 
 
Generically quantified sentences are sentences in which the generic interpretation 
is achieved through the binding of the variables to be generalized over by the generic 
quantifier (see Krifka et al. 1995 and Heim 1982). As originally proposed by Kamp 1981 
and Heim 1982, the variables are introduced in the logical form by indefinite nominals – 
in our case, IS and BN subjects. The logical forms of generically quantified sentences are 
tripartite structures where the generic quantifier (GEN) binds the variables to be 
generalized over in the restrictor and in the nuclear scope as in (9). According to this 
analysis, IS and BP generic sentences  are sentences under the scope of a covert generic 
quantifier, as in (10). 
 
                                                 
2 The asterisk refers only to the generic readings. In this example, the IS has a very natural existential 
reading. 
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(9)  GEN [x,s] (Restriction [x,s] ∧ C [x,s]; Nuclear Scope [x,s])3 
 
(10) a.  A jaguar runs/Jaguars run fast. 
b.  GEN [x,s] (jaguar [x] ∧ C[s,x]; run-fast [x,s]) 
Paraphrase: If x is a jaguar/if x are jaguars and s is a normal running situation that 
contains x, x runs fast in s. 
 
Note that the logical forms in (9) and (10b) do not elicit the semantics of GEN, 
and that they ascribe the same interpretation to both IS and BP subject generic sentences. 
The semantics of GEN will be discussed in the next section, and the differences between 
the two types of sentences will be discussed in sections 4 and 5. 
 
3. The semantics of GEN 
 
 Krifka et al 1995, inspired by Kratzer 1981, claim that GEN should be interpreted 
as a modal quantifier. Sentences under the scope of the generic quantifier behave very 
much like modal sentences: (i) they tolerate exceptions; (ii) they express non-accidental 
generalizations; (iii) they can be paraphrased by counterfactual sentences; and (iv) they 
express a variety of generalizations (see Krifka et al 1995 and Greenberg 2002, among 
others). 
The IS generic sentence in (11) is not synonymous with the universally quantified 
sentence in (12) – it does not become false if we find some dogs that are not good 
companions. Like most generic sentences, it tolerates exceptions. A more accurate 
paraphrase of (11) is (13). IS generic sentences demand that we take only normal 
situations into account, and that we set the exceptions aside. They are equivalent to 
counterfactual sentences. The truth conditions of counterfactual sentences are given in 
terms of possible worlds, as illustrated by (14) (see Heim 1982 and Lewis 1973). 
 
(11) Um cachorro é um bom companheiro. 
a     dog         is a   good companion 
‘A dog is a good companion’ 
 
(12) All dogs are good companions. 
 
(13) Usually dogs are good companions. 
 
(14) If we take into account only the most normal or typical situations and/or worlds, 
in these situations and/or worlds, every dog is a good companion. 
 
Let us now compare the universally quantified sentence in (15) to the BN 
sentence in (16). Sentence (15) describes a peculiar fact about the state of Bahia. 
Sentence (16), on the other hand, describes a general pattern concerning teachers in 
Bahia. If due to a rare coincidence the situation described by (15) turned out to be true, 
the sentence in (16) would remain false. This would be so because generically quantified 
                                                 
3 C[x,s] means something like “s contains x and s is an appropriate situation for the event described by the 
Nuclear Scope to occur in”. See Krifka et al 1995 and Chierchia 1995 for details about the formalism. 
 
4
Semantics of Under-Represented Languages in the Americas, Vol. 2 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/sula/vol2/iss1/6
GENERIC SENTENCES WITH INDEFINITE AND BARE SUBJECTS IN BP 
 
75
sentences express non-accidental generalizations. They state that the generalizations they 
express are also valid in other hypothetical situations. Note that sentence (16) can also be 
paraphrased by the counterfactual sentence in (17).  
Modal sentences ask us to take into account other situations and/or possible 
worlds when we evaluate their truth or falsity. They do not speak only of things as they 
are, but make us think of ideal situations where things are as they ‘should be’, as they 
‘usually are’, as we ‘wished they were’, and so on.  
 
(15)  Todas as   professoras primárias               têm  olho azul na       Bahia. 
     All      the teachers      elementary-school have eye  blue in-the Bahia. 
‘All elementary school teachers have blue eyes in Bahia’  
 
(16) Professora primária                 tem olho azul na      Bahia. 
Teacher     elementary-school has  blue eye  in-the Bahia 
‘Elementary school teachers have blue eyes in Bahia’ 
 
(17) Typically, if this were a high school teacher in Bahia, he would have blue eyes. 
 
Besides being modal, GEN is also universal because it quantifies over all 
individuals or situations under its scope (exceptions aside) as illustrated by the 
paraphrases of (18) and (19). 
 
(18) A dog is a good companion. 
Paraphrase: ‘Usually, all dogs are good companions’   
 
(19) Elementary school teachers have blue eyes in Bahia. 
Paraphrase: ‘Typically, all elementary school teachers have blue eyes in Bahia’ 
 
Kratzer 1981 develops a theory that accounts for the interpretation of modal 
sentences in natural languages. She shows that the semantics of modal sentences in 
natural languages involves three parameters: a modal force, a modal base and an ordering 
source. The modal force determines whether the sentence expresses universal or 
existential quantification over worlds. It is expressed by the necessity and the possibility 
operators of modal logic. The necessity operator (N) quantifies over every possible 
world, so that a sentence under its scope is claimed to be true in all worlds, as illustrated 
by (20). The possibility operator (P) claims that there is at least one world in which the 
sentence under its scope is true, as in (21).   
 
(20) N (an even number is divisible by 2) 
Paraphrase: ‘In all worlds, every even number is divisible by 2’ 
 
(21) P (Jorge is happy) 
Paraphrase: ‘There is at least one world in which Jorge is happy’ 
 
The expression of modality in natural languages is much more subtle, though. 
Sentences like (22) and (23), for example, do not express a logical truth or a logical 
possibility. Their interpretations are dependent on context, as their paraphrases show. A 
context may be characterized as a set of propositions. Modal sentences of natural 
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languages are evaluated against the set of propositions which constitute their modal base. 
Since every proposition may be defined as the set of worlds in which it is true, the modal 
base is a set of sets of worlds. It determines the worlds over which the modal operator 
quantifies.  
  
(22) It is necessary that Jorge leaves. 
Possible paraphrase: ‘In view of the relevant circumstances, it is necessary that Jorge 
leaves.’ 
 
(23) It is possible that Jorge leaves. 
Possible paraphrase: ‘In view of the circumstances, it is possible that Jorge leaves.’ 
 
Finally, the ordering source ranks the worlds of the modal base according to some 
world chosen as standard. Imagine that (22) expresses a command. In that case, besides 
evaluating the truth of the sentence relative to worlds in which the relevant circumstances 
are true – worlds in which Jorge entered a church without a shirt, for instance – we have 
to rank these worlds relative to a standard world where rules are always followed. A 
closer paraphrase to the meaning of (22), according to this analysis, is (24) or, in more 
formal terms, (25). 
 
(24) Considering the relevant facts and taking into account the usual norms of good 
social behavior, it is necessary that Jorge leaves. 
 
(25) In all worlds in which the relevant circumstances obtain, and that are worlds in 
which the norms are respected, Jorge leaves. 
 
Kratzer’s theory of modals is used by Heim 1982, Krifka 1987, and Krifka et al 
1995 to describe the semantics of GEN. The modal force of GEN is always universal 
quantification over the relevant worlds. The modal base of generic sentences is always 
circumstantial. They are evaluated relative to some contextually determined 
circumstances. The ordering source will be contextually determined. 
The interpretation of generic sentences will then call for different modal bases and 
ordering sources. Sentence (26), for example, calls for evaluation in worlds that are 
compatible with Brazilian customs, and ranks these worlds in order to pick out the most 
stereotypical ones. Sentence (27), on the other hand, speaks of worlds that behave 
according to what we know about animals and ranks them relative to their ‘normality’. 
 
(26) Um brasileiro come feijoada às        quartas. 
 a    Brazilian  eats   feijoada on-the Wednesdays 
‘A Brazilian eats feijoada on Wednesdays’ 
 
Paraphrase: ‘In view of Brazilian customs, and taking into account worlds where 
Brazilians behave typically, a Brazilian eats feijoada on Wednesdays.’  
 
(27) Onça   é  carnívora. 
Jaguar is carnivorous 
‘Jaguars are carnivorous’ 
6
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Paraphrase: ‘In view of what is known, and taking into account only ‘normal’ situations, 
jaguars are carnivorous.’ 
 
The use of ordering sources accounts for the tolerance of exceptions of generically 
quantified sentences. GEN quantifies over worlds similar enough to a contextually 
chosen standard. Sentence (27), for example, generalizes over ‘normal’ worlds, worlds in 
which jaguars have the normal properties of the adult jaguars of our world. We are led to 
set aside exceptional worlds, worlds where, for instance, jaguars are only fed carrots and 
milk. The interpretation of GEN according to this view is illustrated in (28b) and (28c) 
and (29b) and (29c). 
 
(28) a.  An even number is divisible by 2. 
 b. GEN [x] (even number [x]; divisible by 2 [x]) 
 c. ∀w' (w' is appropriately accessible from w) ∀x ((even-number [x,w']) 
(divisible-by-2 [x,w'])) 
 
Paraphrase: ‘In all worlds w' appropriately accessible from w, every even number is 
divisible by 2.’ 
 
Modal force: necessity (∀) 
Modal base: circumstantial (‘in view of mathematical laws’) 
Ordering source: not needed if one assumes that mathematical laws are universal 
 
(29)  a.  Jaguars are carnivorous  
 b.  GEN [x] (jaguar [x]; carnivorous [x]) 
 c.  ∀w’(w’ is appropriately accessible from w) ∀x ((jaguar [x,w’]) (carnivorous 
[x,w’])) 
 
Paraphrase: ‘In all worlds w’ appropriately accessible from w, every (non-exceptional) 
jaguar is carnivorous.’ 
 
Modal force: necessity (∀) 
Modal base: circumstantial (‘in view of what we know about animals...’) 
Ordering source: worlds are ranked relative to a ‘normal’ world 
 
We have seen that the interpretation of GEN as a modal universal quantifier 
accounts for many of the properties of IS and BP generic sentences – their tolerance of 
exceptions, the law-likeness of their generalizations, and their similarity to 
counterfactuals. IS and BP generic sentences, however, as we will see in the next section, 
are subject to different types of contextual restrictions. 
 
4. Differences between IS and BN generic sentences 
 
Differences and similarities between IS and BP English generic sentences have 
been described in the literature for some time (Burton-Roberts 1997, Declerk 1991, 
Lawler 1973 and, more recently, Greenberg 2002). Just like IS and BP English generic 
sentences, both IS and BN generic sentences in BPg: (i) express non-accidental 
generalizations; (ii) may express laws; and (iii) tolerate exceptions.  
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Imagine there are only three lions left in the world and that because of a 
madman’s attack all of them have had one of their legs cut off. Even in such an extreme 
case as this one, both (30a) and (30b) would count as false, for the generalization is 
entirely accidental. The sentences in (31) clearly express a mathematical law and 
illustrate the ability of IS and BN generic sentences to express laws in BPg. The tolerance 
of exceptions of IS and BN generic sentences in BPg is illustrated by (32a, b) which are 
true in spite of their obvious exceptions. 
 
(30) a.  Um leão tem três   pernas. 
     a     lion has  three legs 
    ‘A lion has three legs’ 
 
b.  Leão tem três   pernas. 
     Lion has  three legs 
     ‘Lions have three legs’ 
 
(31) a.  Um número par   é   divisível por 2.  
     a     number even is divisible  by  2 
     ‘An even number is divisible by 2’ 
 
b.  Número par   é  divisível por 2. 
     Number even is divisible by 2 
     ‘Even numbers are divisible by 2’ 
 
(32) a.  Um cachorro é  um bom companheiro.  
     a     dog         is a    good companion 
 ‘A dog is a good companion’ 
 
b.  Cachorro é  bom companheiro. 
     dog          is good companion 
 ‘Dogs are good companions’ 
 
And now for the differences: First, both IS and BN subjects may be interpreted 
generically in sentences with episodic predicates. Nevertheless, they have different 
restrictions. Note that (33a), when uttered out of the blue, calls for a specific 
interpretation of its subject – “A certain Brazilian eats feijoada today”. The BN subject of 
(33b), on the other hand, is always generic – “Every Brazilian eats feijoada today”.  
 
(33) a.  Um brasileiro come feijoada hoje.   
         a     Brazilian  eats   feijoada today 
        ‘A Brazilian eats feijoada today’ 
 
b.  Brasileiro come feijoada  hoje.    
          Brazilian  eats   feijoada  today 
 ‘Brazilians eat feijoada today’ 
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The same pattern does not hold for the pair of sentences in (34) – they both have a 
salient generic reading. Intuitively, the difference between the two pairs of sentences is 
that we know that there is a property, e.g., that people are not supposed to work on 
important religious holidays, that supports the generalization stated by (34). The same is 
not true for (33). 
 
(34) a.  Um judeu não trabalha hoje (said on Yom Kippur day). 
     a     Jew    not works    today 
 ‘A Jew does not work today’   
 
 b.  Judeu não trabalha hoje (said on Yom Kippur day). 
      Jew    not  works    today 
   ‘Jews do not work today’ 
 
I will now depict two scenarios in order to clear up this point: an ‘inductive 
scenario’ and a ‘predictive’ scenario (see Greenberg 2002, chap. III). We will see that IS 
sentences fit predictive scenarios, whereas BN sentences fit both types of scenarios. 
 
Inductive Scenario: It’s Wednesday and we are taking one of our visitors for lunch for the 
first time. We check the menu of many restaurants and our visitor notices that the main 
dish is always feijoada. She should say (35b), not (35a). 
 
(35) a.  #Um brasileiro come feijoada hoje. 
             a     Brazilian  eats   feijoada today 
      ‘A Brazilian eats feijoada today’ 
 
b.  Brasileiro come feijoada hoje. 
          Brazilian  eats   feijoada today 
     ‘Brazilians eat feijoada today’ 
 
Predictional Scenario: It’s Wednesday and we are taking one of our visitors for lunch. 
Since she knows the Brazilian tradition of eating feijoada on Wednesday, she may utter 
either (36a) or (b). 
 
(36) a.  Um brasileiro come feijoada hoje. 
     a     Brazilian eats    feijoada today 
 ‘A Brazilian eats feijoada today’ 
 
b.  Brasileiro come feijoada hoje. 
     Brazilian  eats   feijoada today 
  ‘Brazilians eat feijoada today’ 
 
Second, IS sentences have a flavor that has been described as analytic or 
normative, whereas BN sentences have a descriptive or inductive flavor. Note the 
naturalness of the generic interpretation of both sentences in (37). In this case, we know 
that ‘having four strophes’ is an essential, defining property of ‘being a sonnet’. On the 
other hand, in (38a), ‘being popular’ is not an analytical or essential property of ‘being a 
romantic song’, and the sentence does not have a salient generic reading.    
9
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(37) a.  Um soneto tem quatro estrofes.   
          a     sonnet has  four     strophes 
 ‘A sonnet has four strophes’ 
 
b.  Soneto tem quatro estrofes.   
      sonnet  has four     strophes 
  ‘Sonnets have four strophes’ 
 
 (38) a.  #Uma canção romântica é  popular.4   
       a       song    romantic   is popular 
     ‘A romantic song is popular’ 
 
b.  Canção romântica é  popular.   
          song     romantic   is popular 
      ‘Love songs are popular’ 
 
Third, IS subjects that express extremely unusual classes tend to be interpreted 
existentially, whereas similar BN subjects are interpreted generically. Compare the pair 
of sentences in (39) to the pair of sentences in (40). In (39a), the class denoted by 
‘Brazilian musician born on the 4th of July in Piauí’ is very uncommon and the specific 
reading of the subject is very salient. In (40a), on the other hand, the class of actors is 
quite natural to us and, in this case, the generic interpretation is also salient. Note also 
that the generic interpretation is the only possible one for the BN-sentences in (39b) and 
(40b).5  
 
(39) a.  Um músico    brasileiro nascido em 4 de julho no       Piauí  
         a     musician  Brazilian born      in   4 of July   in-the Piauí  
 
  escreve canções sofisticadas.  
  writes   songs     sophisticated 
 
 ‘A Brazilian musician born on the fourth of July in Piauí writes very 
sophisticated songs’ 
 
        b.  Músico    brasileiro nascido em 4 de julho no       Piauí escreve  
      musician  Brazilian born      in   4 of July   in-the Piauí writes      
 
  canções sofisticadas.  
  songs    sophisticated 
 
  ‘Brazilian musicians born on the fourth of July in Piauí write very 
sophisticated songs’  
                                                 
4 ‘#’ marks that the generic reading is odd. 
5 My claims hold for colloquial spoken BPg. BN subject sentences with a specific interpretation occur 
frequently in headlines. They do not occur, however, either in the spoken language or in other forms of 
written language. 
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(40) a.  Um ator   famoso ganha muito dinheiro. 
     an   actor famous earns  much  money 
 ‘A famous actor makes a lot of money’ 
 
b.  Ator famoso ganha muito dinheiro  
     actor famous earns much money 
 ‘Famous actors make a lot of money’ 
 
Summarizing, we may say that, in spite of their similarities, IS and BN generic 
sentences differ systematically. IS generic sentences only express generalizations that are 
backed up by some culturally shared information, whereas BN generic sentences are 
generalizations per se - they do not imply/presuppose any supporting information. In the 
next section, I present Greenberg’s 2002 account of the similarities and differences in the 
semantics of IS and BP subject generic sentences of English.  
 
5. Greenberg's 2002 account  
 
For Greenberg 2002, both IS and BP English generic sentences are instances of 
generic quantification. As we have seen above, in these cases, genericity is an effect of 
the GEN quantifier binding the variables over which the generalization is stated. 
Greenberg adopts Krifka et al´s1995 proposal that GEN is a modal quantifier, and locates 
the differences between the two types of sentences in the kind of modality each one is 
capable of expressing. According to the author, IS sentences and BP sentences differ in 
the kind of modality they involve, i.e., they characterize different sets of accessible 
worlds relative to which they are evaluated (tolerance of exceptions aside). 
IS generic sentences only express 'in virtue of' generalizations. "This means that 
an integral part of the meaning of these sentences is having in mind some appropriately 
chosen property or aspect of our world, in virtue of which the generalization they express 
is true" (Greenberg 2002:64). Thus, the meaning of the English sentence (41a), is 
paraphrasable by (41b). The logical form in (42) expresses the truth conditions of 
sentence (41a). 
 
(41) a.  A Brazilian is easy-going.  
 b.  ‘In virtue of a certain property associated with being a Brazilian (e.g. being 
influenced by the country's mild climate) every Brazilian is easy-going.’ 
 
(42) ∀w' (∀x (^Brazilian [x,w']) (^being influenced by Brazil’s mild climate [x,w'])) 
(∀x (Brazilian [x,w']) (is-easy-going [x,w'])) 
 
Paraphrase: ‘In all worlds where every Brazilian has the property of being influenced by 
the country’s mild weather, every Brazilian is easy-going.’ 
 
As for bare plural subject sentences, Greenberg 2002 claims that they may express 
both ‘in virtue of’ and descriptive generalizations. When expressing a descriptive 
generalization, BP sentences only claim that the generalization is not accidental, that 
there is a pattern to the phenomena. There is no demand that the generalization be in 
virtue of some shared property. Its modal base is made of worlds similar to ours in a 
rather vague way. An English sentence like (43a) thus, when interpreted as a descriptive 
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generalization, is closely paraphrased by (43b). The logical form in (44) expresses the 
truth conditions of the BP sentence (43a), according to Greenberg.  
 
(43) a.  Brazilians are easy-going. 
 b.  ‘The generalization “every Brazilian is easy-going” is not accidental - i.e. not 
limited to the actual set of circumstances - but is expected to hold in other 
circumstances.’ 
 
(44) ∀w' (Max [w',w]) ∀x ((Brazilian [x,w']) (easy-going [x,w'])), where: 
 
Max (w',w) holds iff w' is maximally similar to w except for what is needed to allow for 
the existence of more, less, or totally different Brazilians (Lewis 1986). 
  
Paraphrase: Brazilians are easy-going is true in w iff in all worlds maximally similar to 
w, every Brazilian is easy-going.’ 
 
Greenberg’s theory explains the more restricted behavior of IS sentences because 
these sentences are said to be true of worlds in which the IS subject has a certain 
property. The accessible worlds are thus drastically restricted. The fact that IS sentences 
are not felicitous with subjects that express extremely uncommon classes is thus 
explained: we cannot find accessible worlds in which the sentence can be evaluated – we 
cannot find a property that is systematically associated with the subject property.    
The reason why IS sentences have a law-like flavor is that for an IS sentence to be 
felicitous, it is necessary that there be a property systematically associated with its 
subject, and that the knowledge about this property be culturally shared. This very 
characteristic explains the preference of IS subjects for a specific interpretation in 
contexts in which there is no salient property that can be associated to the IS subject. 
BP sentences, on the other hand, can express more descriptive generalizations and 
do not demand that the generalizations be due to some more basic or essential property of 
their subjects. Therefore the worlds in which they are evaluated are worlds that are 
similar to ours in a more general and vague way. That is why their occurrence is much 
less restricted. 
In section 3, we saw that the similarities and differences between IS and BN 
sentences in BPg are the same as the ones found for IS- and BP-sentences in English. The 
characterization of these sentences as ‘in virtue of’ generalizations and descriptive 
generalizations apply to BPg. I will then follow Greenberg 2002 in attributing them to the 
different types of modalities expressed by each of these kinds of sentences. 
The question that remains to be answered is how to derive the differences between 
the worlds accessed by IS and BN generic sentences from the different semantics of 
indefinite descriptions and bare nominals in BPg. 
 
6. Deriving the differences between IS and BN sentences in BPg 
 
In this section, I claim that the differences between the kinds of modalities 
expressed by IS and BN generic sentences in BPg should be attributed to the different 
denotations of singular indefinite descriptions and of bare numberless nominals in the 
language.  
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How does Greenberg 2002 explain the difference in availability of accessibility 
relations according to the different semantics of IS and BP generic sentences? According 
to her, IS subjects are indefinites, whereas BP subjects are kind-referring expressions. 
When BP sentences participate in generically quantified sentences, therefore, some kind 
of realization relation makes instances of the kind available for quantification (Chierchia 
1998, Krifka et al 1995, von Fintel 1994, Delfitto 1996). 
Greenberg points out that the restriction of GEN in IS generic sentences contains 
a property expression, and that properties systematically relate to other properties. This 
way, the similarity of the accessible worlds to the actual one in IS generic sentences is 
automatically characterized in terms of properties provided by our real world knowledge. 
Consequently, only the ‘in virtue of’ accessibility relation is available. 
BP generic sentences, on the other hand, have kind expressions in their 
restrictions. Kinds come with no systematic relation to other properties since they are 
entities, not properties. The effect is that the characterization of the accessible worlds of 
BP sentences is defined in a default, vague way (maximal similarity), and both the 
‘descriptive’ and the ‘in virtue of’ accessibility relations are available. 
Greenberg’s 2002 explanation cannot be applied to BPg since IS and BN subjects 
are both predicates in the language. This means that the different semantics of the two 
sentences cannot be attributed to the kind-referring versus generic quantification 
distinction. So the question remains of what it is about the denotations of IS and BN 
subjects that makes them favor the expression of different types of modalities.  
In Müller 2001, 2002, I claim that both common nouns and bare numberless 
nominals in BPg have denotations that are mass in the sense that they cannot be counted. 
Common nouns and BNs in BPg have number-neutral denotations - they denote both 
atoms and pluralities. One piece of evidence for their being number-neutral comes from 
the fact that these nominals behave as if they have a non-discrete denotation. A sentence 
like (45) means that Jorge reads an indefinite number of magazines after dinner. He may 
read one or more magazines; actually, Jorge does not even need to read a whole 
magazine. 
 
(45) Jorge sempre lê       revista    depois do       jantar. 
 Jorge always reads magazine after    of-the dinner 
 ‘Jorge always reads magazines after dinner’ 
 
Unlike languages with a clear distinction between count and mass nouns, where 
bare singular NPs have a very restricted distribution, Bare Numberless Nominals in BPg 
are extremely frequent and broadly used. BPg bare numberless nominals, even when 
denoting ontologically discrete entities, occur in typical mass contexts such as with the 
mass quantifier ‘muito’ (46); with the word suficiente (‘enough’), which can only be used 
with mass terms (47): and with mass ‘classifiers’ (48) (see Bunt 1985). 
 
(46) Tem muita mala      no      carro. 
Has  much suitcase in-the car 
‘There are many suitcases in the car’ 
 
(47) Eu já          escrevi carta suficiente hoje. 
I    already wrote   letter enough     today 
‘I’ve written enough letters for today’ 
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(48) Jorge queimou 10 quilos de jornal         hoje. 
Jorge burned    10 kilos   of newspaper today 
‘Jorge burned 10 kilos of newspapers today’ 
 
Bare Numberless nominals can occur with collective predicates (49), unlike 
singular indefinite descriptions (50). They are also unable to provide a domain for 
distributive quantifiers such as cada in BPg (51), as opposed to indefinite descriptions 
(52).   
 
(49) Urso se  reune  em caverna. 
bear  self meets in   cave 
‘Bears meet in caves’ 
 
(50) *Um urso se    reune  em caverna. 
      a     bear self meets in   cave 
 ‘A bear meets in caverns’ 
 
(51) *Cada  aluno    leu    livro. 
     Each   student read book 
‘Each student read books’ 
 
(52) Cada aluno   leu   um livro.  
Each student read a    book 
‘Each student read a book’ 
 
In Müller 2001 and 2002, I claim that BPg has a NUMber operator and a 
CLassifier operator  that act on the number-neutral denotation of Noun Phrases (NP). The 
structure in (53) is meant to represent the scope relations of these operators inside the 
Determiner Phrase (DP) in BPg. The operator CL is a sortal operator – it turns mass into 
individuals. When covert, it is a default classifier that turns mass into entity – an  
‘entitizer’.  
The NUMber operator, when SINGular, selects the atomic entities of an already 
classified NP denotation. The PLural operator selects the non-atomic entities of the 
denotation of a NP. An IS-phrase always ends up with an atomic denotation - at the point 
where the indefinite article is adjoined to the structure both CL and NUM have applied. 
On the other hand, a BN-phrase has a number-neutral denotation – neither the CL nor the 
NUM operation has applied.  
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(53) Determiner Phrase  
 :  
 :  
 Number Phrase, <e,t>  
   
NUMber  Classifier Phrase, <e,t> 
 (SING/PL)   
 Classifier Noun Phrase, <e,t> 
   
  Noun <e,t> 
 
Let us now tackle the question of how the differences between the denotations of 
IS- and BN-Phrases lead to their favoring this or that kind of modality. 
In BPg, generalizations made by IS sentences are stated over atomic individuals, 
whereas generalizations of BN sentences are founded on a number-neutral domain, where 
the substance is not yet classified or counted. Generalizations based on atomic entities 
have to be very robust, since the patterns concerning these entities are based on properties 
of each of the atomic individuals in the domain. If all atomic individuals of a domain 
have a certain property, and this domain embraces various worlds, this property is, in 
some way, ‘essential’. A richer domain, on the other hand, like the one of bare 
numberless nouns (BNs), allows for a broader number of patterns to emerge – many other 
patterns that do not rely necessarily on individual properties may emerge. In this sense, 
the denotation of BNs, being pre-sortal, does not depend on ‘laws’ or on `essential’ 
properties of each of its members. 
 
7.  Concluding remarks  
 
Based on my previous work on BPg (Müller 2001, 2002), this paper builds on the 
analysis of both IS and BN generic sentences as instances of generic quantification 
sentences. As suggested by Greenberg 2002 for English IS and BP sentences, IS generic 
sentences in BPg are claimed to express 'in virtue of' generalizations; whereas BN generic 
sentences in BPg are claimed to express both 'in virtue of' and descriptive generalizations. 
The differences between the two types of sentences are attributed to the fact that they 
express different kinds of modalities, that is, they are evaluated in different sets of 
possible worlds. Finally, the paper claims that the difference between the worlds accessed 
by IS and BN generic sentences is a result of the generic quantifier having scope over 
different types of entities: atomic entities in the case of IS subjects, and number-neutral 
entities in the case of BN subjects - the different denotations allow for more or less 
restricted patterns to emerge.  
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